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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DETERMINING PURPOSE: THOU
SHALT NOT STUDY THE EVOLUTION OF
RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS
McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLUof Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005)*
Shari Ben Moussa**
Two Kentucky Counties (Respondents) each posted a large, readily
visible gold-framed copy of the Ten Commandments (Commandments) on
their courthouse walls.' Alleging that the two displays violated the First

*

Editor's Note: This Case Comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for the

Outstanding Case Comment for Spring 2006.
** J.D. anticipated December 2007, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A. with
College Honors, Washington University in St. Louis, 2002. To my family for their love and
guidance. Thank you Anis, Erica, Mom, Dad, and Grandma.
1. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2727-28 (2005). The two
counties were McCreary County and Pulaski County. Id. The display in McCreary County
responded to a legislative order that required "the display [to] be posted in 'a very high traffic area'
of the courthouse." Id. (citing ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County, Ky., 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 684
(E.D. Ky. 2000)). During the ceremonial display of the Commandments in Pulaski County, the
county Judge-Executive, accompanied by the pastor of his church, declared the Commandments
as "good rules to live by." Id. (citing Dodson, COMMONWEALTH J., July 25, 1999, at A1-2, in
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Civ. A. No. 99-509
(ED Ky.)). Pulaski County's first and second displays included the following version of the
Commandments followed by a citation to Exodus 20:3-17:
"Thou shalt have no other gods before me."
"Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven images."
"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain."
"Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy."
"Honor thy father and thy mother."
"Thou shalt not kill."
"Thou shalt not commit adultery."
"Thou shalt not steal."
"Thou shalt not bear false witness."
"Thou shalt not covet."
Id. The text of the Commandments was similar in McCreary County's first and second displays.
Id. at 2728 n.2.
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Amendment Establishment Clause,2 the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) sought a preliminary injunction against the courthouse displays.3
In the interim, the Respondents adopted resolutions authorizing the
erection of modified displays that integrated the Commandments,
Kentucky's "precedent legal code,"4 and other historical documents.5
Although the second version of the displays advanced more of a secular
purpose,6 the district court issued a preliminary injunction to remove the
displays To comply with the injunction, the Respondents modified the
displays a third time, this time claiming that the displays advanced an
educational purpose due to the addition of other historical documents.8
However, the district court subsequently included these displays in the
injunction,9 and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed."° The
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari," affirmed and HELD,

2. McCreary County, Ky., 125 S.Ct. at 2729. See infra text accompanying note 13.
3. ACLUofKy., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 682. The ACLU sought injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Id.at 684.
4. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.195 (2006).
5. McCrearyCounty, Ky., 125 S.Ct. at 2727. The second displays contained eight smaller,
historical documents including the Declaration of Independence's "endowed by their Creator"
passage; the Preamble to the Constitution of Kentucky; the national motto, "In God We Trust"; a
proclamation by President Reagan marking 1983 the Year of the Bible; and the Mayflower
Compact. Id.at 2729.
6. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.195 (2006). According to the resolution, "[t]he purpose of
the display shall not be to advance religion ....
"but rather "[t]o advance the secular purpose of
making citizens of the Commonwealth more knowledgeable concerning the founding of America,
the intent of the nation's Founders, and the formative influence of the Bible and the Ten
Commandments on American leaders, institutions, and law." Id. The resolution stated that a copy
of the resolution must accompany any display of the Commandments in classrooms and on public
property. Id.
7. ACLUofKy., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
8. ACLU ofKy. v. McCreary County, Ky., 145 F. Supp. 2d 845,846,853 (E.D. Ky. 2001),
aft'd, 354 F.3d 438 (Cir. 2003), afj'd, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (2005). The Respondents changed counsel
before posting the third display of the "King James Version" of the Commandments. McCreary
County, Ky., 125 S.Ct. at 2730. The third display, entitled "The Foundations of American Law and
Government Display," consisted of nine framed documents of equal size that explained how the
Commandments influenced the development of Western legal thought and the Nation. ACLU of
Ky., 145 F. Supp. 2d at 846-47. The expanded displays also included the Star Spangled Banner's
lyrics and a picture of Lady Justice, accompanied by statements about their historical and legal
significance to educate the Respondents' citizens. Id. at 846.
9. ACLUofKy., 145 F. Supp. 2d at 853, af'd,354 F.3d 438 (Cir. 2003), aft'd, 125 S.Ct.
2722 (2005).
10. ACLU ofKy. v. McCreary County, Ky., 354 F.3d 438,462 (Cir. 2003), af'd, 125 S.Ct.
2722 (2005).
11. McCrearyCounty, Ky., 125 S.Ct. at 2732. The Court stated that the issues were whether
a determination of the Respondents' purpose was a "sound basis" for assessing Establishment
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consideration of the evolution of the displays to determine the
Respondents' purpose
is valid when there is an alleged Establishment
2
violation.'
Clause
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides in relevant
part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof... ."" An inherent ambiguity in the
analysis of First Amendment Establishment Clause issues lies in
determining what degree of separation between church and state is
constitutionally required given the prevalent role of religion in American
history.' 4 Courts struggle to interpret the language of the Establishment
Clause because of this deep-rooted uncertainty. 5 However, in Lemon v.

Clause violations and whether the evolution of the displays was relevant in the evaluation of the
Respondents' claims of the displays' secular purpose. Id. at 2728.
12. Id. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court, with whom Justice O'Connor
concurred and filed opinion. Id. at 2727, 2746.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause was made applicable to the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
215 (1963); see also Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 680-81 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(noting that "the line we must draw between the permissible and the impermissible is one which
accords with history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers.").
What the Framers meant to foreclose, and what our decisions under the
Establishment Clause have forbidden, are those involvements of religious with
secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious
institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious
purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, where
secular means would suffice.
Walz, 397 U.S. at 680.
14. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). The Court has stated that "total
separation is not possible in an absolute sense" because "[s]ome relationship between government
and religious organizations is inevitable." Id. Additionally, complete separation of church and state
is not constitutionally required. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1984) (noting that
Congress enacted legislation to pay chaplains for the House and Senate during the same week that
Congress approved the Establishment Clause as part of the Bill of Rights). See also Schempp, 374
U.S. at 212 (stating that "religion has been closely identified with our history and government");
Marsh v.Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,784,787 (1983) (upholding an opening prayer before legislative
sessions).
15. McCreary County, Ky., 125 S.Ct. at 2733 n.10. The Court noted that, since Everson v.
BoardofEducationofEwing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), "it has been clear that [the] Establishment Clause
doctrine lacks the comfort of categorical absolutes." Id See also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13
(finding that it is difficult to determine whether a law merely respects religion or whether it
establishes religion in violation of the Establishment Clause due to the "opaque" language of the
First Amendment).
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Kurtzman, 16 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that a statute may violate
the Establishment Clause if the statute fails to satisfy the requirements of
a three-part test.17 Under the Lemon test, a "statute must have a secular
legislative purpose," its "principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion," and "the statute must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion."' 8 Although Lemon
continues to influence the Court, the Court has stated that the test is not
always useful. 9
In Lemon, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether statutes
authorizing state aid to religious schools violated the Establishment
Clause. 2 Rhode Island's statute authorized the state to provide a fifteen
percent annual salary supplement to teachers of secular subjects in churchrelated elementary schools.2 ' The state not only required eligible schools
to submit financial data, but also examined school records on occasion to
ascertain whether the expenditures supported primarily secular or religious
education.22 Pennsylvania's statute authorized the state to directly
reimburse nonpublic elementary and secondary schools for the cost of
teachers' salaries and for various educational materials used in secular
subjects.23 The state required schools receiving reimbursements to
maintain certain accounts, subject to state audit, to ensure that educational
costs were only dedicated to secular studies.24
To determine whether government entanglement with religion was
excessive, the Court reasoned that it was necessary to examine the purpose
of the supported institutions, the nature of the State aid, and the ensuing
relationship between the government and the religious body. The Court
acknowledged that deference should be given to the legislature because the
statutes intended to advance secular education by requiring government
16. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.
17. Id. at 612-13 (citing Bd. ofEduc. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,243 (1968); Walz, 397 U.S. at
674). See also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,585 (1987) (noting that the Supreme Court has
recently reframed the Lemon analysis by focusing on whether the statute's purpose or the statute's
effect led to governmental endorsement of religion).
18. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
19. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S.Ct. 2854,2861 (2005) (citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
741 (1973) (stating that the Lemon factors serve as "no more than helpful signposts.")).
20. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606.
21. Id. at 607.
22. Id. at 607-08. The state performed surveillance when the average expenditure on secular
education per nonpublic school student exceeded that of a public school student. Id. at 620.
23. Id. at 606-07. The state cigarette tax provided the funds necessary to reimburse the
schools. Id. at 610.
24. Id. at 610.
25. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
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surveillance.26 However, the Court emphasized that nonpublic churchrelated schools have a mission to promote religious values, regardless of
the statutes' intended objective to reimburse and to supplement secular
education.27 Therefore, the Court reasoned that state surveillance of the
schools' expenditures may conflict with the First Amendment.28
Additionally, the Court explained that annual state aid to church-related
schools may influence political activity because voters in opposition of or
in support of the state aid may vote based on religious beliefs.29
Furthermore, the Court noted that the mixture of church and state may
potentially affect students of such an impressionable age.3" Thus, the Court
held that the statutes violated the Establishment Clause because they
fostered excessive government entanglement in religion.3'
In Stone v. Graham, the Court applied Lemon to a Kentucky statute,
which required public schools to post the Ten Commandments on
classroom walls.32 The statute required the Commandments to include a
notation, which referred to the Commandments as a "fundamental legal
code."3 3 The Petitioners sought an injunction against the statute's
enforcement claiming that the statute violated the Establishment and Free

26. See id. at 613, 616.
27. Id. at 613. For example, the Court explained that in Rhode Island, the nonpublic schools
were located near parish churches, religious symbols adorned school buildings, and the majority
of the teachers were nuns. Id. at 615.
28. Id.at 619-20. The Court explained that "a textbook's content is ascertainable, but a
teacher's handling of a subject is not," and "[u]nlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so
as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the
limitations imposed by the First Amendment." Id. at 617,619. However, in his concurring opinion,
Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Black joined, wrote that without state surveillance, "the zeal
of religious proselytizers" may actually infringe on the Establishment Clause. Id.at 627. For
example, Justice Douglas wrote that even in a mathematics course, a teacher at a parochial school
said to her class, "If it takes forty thousand priests and a hundred and forty thousand sisters to care
for forty million Catholics in the United States, how many more priests and sisters will be needed
to convert and care for the hundred million non-Catholics in the United States?" Id.at 635 (citing
JOSEPH H. FICHTER, PAROCHIAL SCHOOL: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY 86 (1958)).
29. Id.at 622. The Court stated that "political division along religious lines was one of the
principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect." Id.
30. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616.
31. Id.at 625. However, the Court noted that complete separation between church and state
was not absolutely possible because nonpublic church-related schools were still permissibly
subjected to state land use and safety regulations. Id.at 614.
32. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39-41 (1980) (per curiam).
33. Id.at 41 (citing KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 158.178 (1980)). The notation in Stone stated:
"The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the
fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States." Id.
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Exercise Clauses.34 The Court addressed whether the statute's "avowed
purpose" was secular or plainly religious in nature.35 The Court held that
the statute violated the Establishment Clause because it lacked a secular
legislative purpose.3 6
The Court first explained that the statute must be invalidated if it
violated any one of the three factors enunciated in Lemon." A notation
claiming an "avowed" secular purpose, the Court reasoned, would not save
the statute from violating the First Amendment. 8 Rather, the Court
explained that posting the Commandments may actually have the effect of
encouraging students to pray.39 Furthermore, it was irrelevant that the
Commandments display was financed by voluntary private contributions
because the legislature's support created a conflict with the Establishment
Clause.4" Thus, the Court concluded that the statute violated the first prong
of Lemon because the statute's "avowed" secular purpose was not in fact
secular.4 The Court distinguished posting the Commandments on
classroom walls from merely integrating the Commandments into class
lessons, which might not violate the Constitution due to its educational
purpose.42

34. Id. at 39-40. The state trial court upheld the statute, and the Supreme Court of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky affirmed, although both decisions were made by heavily divided
courts. Id. at 40.
35. Id. at40-41.
36. Id. The Court explained that the Commandments are widely recognized as a sacred text
in Judaism and Christianity. Id. at 41.
37. Stone, 449 U.S. at 40-41.
38. Id. at 41. The Court stated that such a notation cannot conceal the inherently religious
purpose of posting the Commandments on classroom walls. Id. The Court noted that it has
previously found prayer and Bible readings in school unconstitutional, even where the school
asserted a secular purpose in the readings. Id. (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 223 (1963)).
39. See id. at 41-42.
40. Id. at 42.
41. See id. at 41. But see id. at 44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that a statute may be constitutional even if the avowed secular purpose overlaps with a
religious objective. Id. The Chief Justice explained that the Court's rejection of the legislature's
avowed secular purpose is without precedent because deference should be given to the legislature's
purpose in Establishment Clause cases. Id. at 43-44. Justice Rehnquist quoted Justice Jackson:
"[m]usic without sacred music, architecture minus the cathedral, or painting without the scriptural
themes would be eccentric and incomplete, even from a secular point of view ... "Stone, 449 U.S.
at 46 (quoting Justice Jackson, concurring in McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,236 (1948)).
42. Stone, 449 U.S. at 42. The majority also distinguished Lemon from Stone because the
state assistance to private schools in Lemon created a secular purpose by supporting education. Id.
at 43 n.5.
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Subsequently, in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the
Court applied Lemon to determine whether student-led prayers at school
football games violated the Establishment Clause.43 Students and their
parents filed a complaint against the school district opposing the prayers.'
Following an order from the district court,45 the school district enacted
various policies regarding student-led prayers at graduation and football
games.' The school's final policy, enacted in October, stemmed from two
student elections that had been held to determine whether to deliver
"invocations" at football games and which student should deliver the
"invocation." ' 7 The Court held that the resultant school football policy
authorizing student-led, student-initiated "invocations" was coercive and
invalid on its face in violation of the Establishment Clause.48
Using Lemon, the Court examined the evolution of the school's football
policy to determine whether the purpose of the policy was primarily
religious in nature. 49 The Court noted that the school's student election

may have created a "limited public forum" because the student body
majority elected the student speaker whose message most likely

43. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315-17 (2000).
44. Id. at 295.
45. Id. at 295-96.
46. Id. at 296-98.
47. Id. at 297-98. The school enacted graduation ceremony policies in May and July and
football game policies in August and October. Id. at 296. The Court only considered the validity
of the October policy. Id. at 298. The May policy authorized the graduating senior class to conduct
two student votes to determine whether to allow and who should deliver "nonsectarian,
nonproselytizing invocations and benedictions" during graduation ceremonies. Id. at 296-97. The
July graduation policy removed the requirement that the invocation and benediction be
"nonsectarian and nonproselytising [sic]," however, the July policy also stated that the May policy
would "automatically become effective" upon injunction of the July policy. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at
297. The August policy provided for two student votes to determine whether to allow invocations
at football games and who should deliver them. Id. Additionally, the August policy also eliminated
the requirement that the invocation be "nonsectarian and nonproselytizing," like the July policy and
included a "fallback provision" to reinstate that requirement upon injunction. Id. The October
policy was substantially similar to the August policy except that the district eliminated or modified
some of the terms used in the August policy. Id. at 298.
48. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301. The Court explained that the prayers were not private speech
because the policies were enforced on school grounds at school-sponsored events. Id. at 302.
Noting that the term "invocation" has always included a religious message, the Court determined
that the policy had an expressly religious purpose. Id. at 306-07. The Court stated that an objective
observer who was acquainted with the policy would "unquestionably perceive the inevitable
pregame prayer as stamped with her school's seal of approval." Id. at 308.
49. Id. at 309. It is the duty of the courts to "distinguis[h] a sham secular purpose from a
sincere one." Id. at 308 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
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represented the majority's viewpoint.5 Additionally, the Court reasoned
that the evolution from the office of "Student Chaplain" to the role of
regulating prayer at football games, coupled with the school's history of
student-led prayers at football games and graduations, revealed the
religious purpose of the school's policy.5 Therefore, the Court explained
that the school district's "sponsorship" of student-broadcasted religious
messages over the school's public address system was "impermissible."52
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for
requiring school policies to be completely content-neutral. 3 The Chief
Justice explained that Establishment Clause cases do not require "content
neutrality," and the lack thereof does not imply government endorsement
of religion.54 Furthermore, the Chief Justice explained that the principle of
neutrality generally applies to freedom of speech cases rather than to
Establishment Clause cases. 5
As it previously did in Stone and Santa Fe, the instant Court in
McCreary County applied the Lemon test to analyze an alleged
Establishment Clause violation after the Respondents posted the
Commandments in their respective county courthouses.5 6 The Respondents
argued that the instant Court should limit its analysis of the Respondents'
purpose under Lemon because their true purpose was "unknowable."57
However, the instant Court stated that Establishment Clause analysis
frequently involves inquiry into a secular purpose, which must be the
primary objective and not a "sham." 8 Furthermore, the instant Court

50. See id.at 304.
51. Id.at 309.
52. Id.
53. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 325 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722,2732-33 (2005). Although
the instant Court incorporated Lemon into its analysis, it focused primarily on the first prong, the
"purpose" prong. See id.
at 2733-34. The instant Court referred to the First Amendment throughout
the instant case, but predominantly applied Lemon to the Establishment Clause, rather than the Free
Exercise Clause. Id.
57. Id.at 2732. The Court noted that scrutiny of purpose alone may be insufficient evidence
of a First Amendment violation because a predominantly religious purpose may not automatically
violate religious neutrality. Id. at 2733 n.10. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791
(1983) (finding that the religious nature of legislative prayer did not violate the Establishment
Clause).
58. See McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2734-36. The instant Court stated that "[t]he
eyes that look to purpose belong to an 'objective observer,' one who takes account of the traditional
external signs that show up in the 'text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,' or
comparable official act." Id.at 2734 (quoting Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308). The instant Court
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reasoned that the constitutionality of the legislative resolutions depended
on whether all parts of the displays had a predominantly secular purpose.5 9
Thus, the instant Court held that a determination of the Respondents'
apparent purpose may be dispositive for assessing a constitutional
violation, and the evolution of the displays should be considered when
determining the Respondents' purpose.6'
Beginning with an analysis of the Respondents' first version of the
courthouse displays, the instant Court compared the facts of the instant
case to Stone because the Respondents in both cases posted the
Commandments in public buildings, thereby triggering a potential First
Amendment violation.6 In both cases, the Respondents failed to create a
predominantly neutral context because they posted the Commandments
alone.62 However, the instant Court distinguished the instant case from
Stone because the first version of the displays failed to include a notation
explaining the relationship between the Commandments and the law.6 3
Therefore, the instant Court reasoned that, by posting the Commandments
alone in the first display, the Respondents in the instant case had a
primarily religious purpose. 64
The instant Court's interpretation of the contextual display of the
Commandments did not substantially differ in the second version of the
displays. 65 Rather, the instant Court reasoned that the evolution of the
displays actually accentuated the Respondents' religious purpose,
regardless of the posted resolutions that allegedly shifted their purpose
from religious to secular.66 The instant Court affirmed that an objective
observer would realize that even the Respondents' second displays

explained that if the purpose test required only some secular purpose, such an approach would
"leave the purpose test with no real bite, given the ease of finding some secular purpose for almost
any government action." Id. at 2736 n.13.
59. See id. at 2736 n. 11. Additionally, Justice O'Connor stated, in a concurring opinion, that
the government is prohibited from coercing people to participate in religion against their will. Id.
at 2746 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1947)).
60. Id. at 2728.
61. Id. at 2737-38.
62. Id. at 2738.
63. McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2738. See supra text accompanying note 33.
64. McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2739.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2739-40 (noting that although the Respondents claimed that the third displays
intended to educate the public, the Respondents failed to convince the district court or the court of
appeals of such a secular purpose).
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advanced a sectarian purpose due to the references to Christ throughout the
posted legislative resolution and the displays.67
With regard to the third version of the courthouse displays, the instant
Court stressed that consideration of the contextual evolution of the
displays was necessary to determine the constitutionality of the displays.68
The Respondents claimed that the historical and legal documents
integrated with the Commandments in these displays served an
educational function. 69 Notwithstanding this claim, the instant Court
doubted the existence of a secular purpose because the two preceding
courts, which failed to find a secular purpose, significantly influenced the
instant Court's analysis of the displays' context.7° Moreover, the instant
Court believed that the Respondents could not convince an objective
observer of a new secular purpose when the third displays included more
religious references than the previous two displays.7 ' Although the
Respondents claimed that the resolutions did not apply to the third
displays, the instant Court asserted that many of the documents included
in the second displays were also found in the third displays, from which
an objective observer might infer that the resolutions applied to both
displays. 2 Therefore, the instant Court determined that, similar to the

67. Id. at 2739. According to the instant Court, an Establishment Clause violation occurs
when the objective observer is aware of a display's religious references. Id at 2737. The instant
Court noted that the Respondents declined to defend the purpose of the second display, yet a
"reasonable observer could not forget it." Id. at 2739.
68. Id. at 2741.
69. McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2739.
70. Id. at 2740 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594 n.15 (1987) (holding that
where preceding courts already ruled on the case and were unable to find a valid secular purpose,
then this Court "normally should hesitate to find one")).
71. Id. at 2740-41. The instant Court explained that, in comparison with the first and second
displays, the third display made relatively more references to the "Lord" and to "God." Id The
instant Court noted that, in addition to the religious references, an objective observer would
question the absence of certain fundamental legal doctrines such as the Fourteenth Amendment in
a display which supposedly established the Commandments as Kentucky's "precedent legal code."
Id. at 2740.
72. Id. at 2740 n.20. See also id. at 2737 (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, at 315)
(noting that "reasonable observers have reasonable memories, and our precedents sensibly forbid
an observer 'to turn a blind eye to the context in which [the] policy arose"')). Although the
Respondents argued that an objective observer would realize that the resolutions did not authorize
the third display, the instant Court reasoned that the language of the resolutions applied to the
documents posted in the third display. Id. at 2740 n.20. Additionally, the Respondents never
rejected the resolutions until the arguments surrounding the instant case arose, at which point they
chose to repeal the resolutions. See id. at 2740 n. 19. Furthermore, the counties did not adopt a new
resolution or repudiate the resolutions accompanying the second set of displays. McCreary County,
Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2740. But see id. at 2763 n. 14. (Scalia, J. dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that
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evolution of the Santa Fe student-led football invocations, the evolution
of the displays at issue in the instant case indicated the Respondents'
underlying religious purpose.7 3
Finally, the instant Court stated that neutrality is a valuable principle
that preserves the intent of the Framers of the First Amendment to prevent
governmental support of any religion.74 The instant Court rejected the
dissent's attempt to limit the neutrality principle despite the dissent's
suggestion that the Framers encouraged zealous support of monotheistic
religions.75 Additionally, the instant Court criticized the dissent's
comparison of a holiday display or an official prayer to a display of the
Commandments by maintaining that unlike a holiday display or an official
prayer, the genuine underlying purpose for posting the Commandments
was to6 compel an objective observer to act or to react based on religious
7
faith.
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas in his dissent,
and by Justice Kennedy as to Parts II and I,"77 Justice Scalia criticized the
majority for applying the principle of neutrality when the nation's history
provides evidence of religious references in government activities.78 In
response to the majority, the dissent stated that the invocation of God may
support widely held religious beliefs as previous case law suggests, but it
does not establish monotheistic religions in violation of the First
Amendment.79 The dissent criticized the majority for using Lemon to
determine the government's purpose based on what was apparent to an
objective observer rather than on the government's actual subjective
purpose.8" The dissent also disagreed with the majority's strict application

the resolutions authorized the second version of the displays, but not the third version of the
displays, because a copy of the resolution did not accompany the Commandments in the latter
displays. Additionally, the third versions of the displays did not include all of the documents listed
in the resolutions and, on the other hand, included some documents not listed in the resolutions. Id.
(Scalia, J. dissenting).
73. Id. at 2741 n.22.
74. McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2742-43.
75. Id. at 2743, 2745.
76. Id. at 2743 n.24.
77. Id. at 2748.
78. Id. at 2750 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Pledge of Allegiance states that we are
a Nation "under God" and that the sessions of the Supreme Court begins "God save the United
States and this Honorable Court"). See also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 45-46 (1980) (per
curiam) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (commenting that the Establishment Clause does not require that
the public be shielded from all religious references).
79. McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2756 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also supra text
accompanying note 14.
80. McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2757 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of the Lemon test, which required that the secular purpose of a
governmental action outweigh any other purpose. 8'
By holding that a display is unconstitutional unless an objective
observer finds a predominantly secular purpose throughout the evolution
of the display, the instant Court broadens the scope of the First
Amendment Establishment Clause.82 The instant Court examined the
purpose of the Respondents' displays by comparing the instant case to the
state aid sent to religious schools in Lemon, the Commandments posted in
classrooms in Stone, and the evolution of a student-led football prayer in
Santa Fe.83 However, the school setting of those cases differs from the
courthouse setting of the displays at issue in the instant case. 84 Therefore,
the instant Court expands the applicability of the Lemon test to
Establishment Clause claims in courthouses, where the purpose of
displays, including displays of religious documents, has different
implications.85
Although the instant Court focuses on each of the three prongs of the
Lemon test, the instant Court substantially changes the purpose prong by
depending on an objective observer to determine neutrality.86 However,
there is an inherent difficulty in determining neutrality due to the personal
sensitivities of even the most objective observers.87 Furthermore, an
objective observer must be aware of religious references for a possible
violation to occur, but there is no way to determine which observers have
knowledge of the Respondents' initial displays or the subsequent

81. Id.
82. See id. at 2757 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's modified Lemon test for
relying too heavily on an objective observer's determination of purpose, rather than the actual
purpose, and for requiring the secular purpose to "predominate" over any other religious purpose).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 14, 32, & 43.
84. See McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2727-31. The Court has "been particularly
vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary
schools." Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854,2863-64 (2005) (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987)).
85. McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2760 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the
frequency of displays of the Commandments provides evidence that the Commandments are
valued as a source of law, which influences government). The instant Court itself has a courtroom
frieze, which depicts Moses, holding tablets exhibiting a portion of the Hebrew text of the later,
secularly phrased Commandments, and seventeen other legal figures. Id. at 2741. See also Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 46 (1980) (per curiam) (Rehnquist J., dissenting) (citing Abington Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,212 (1963) (noting that the Court has recognized that "religion has
been closely identified with our history and government")).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 54 & 55.
87. See McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2752 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that the
principle of neutrality challenges historical and current tendencies).
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resolution, which may lead to differing opinions of purpose.8 Thus, the
instant Court may actually create a pool of biased observers by requiring
an objective observer to possess a certain degree of knowledge before the
observer can form an opinion about a display's purpose or analyze the
significance of a display's evolution.89
The instant Court expands the use of the Lemon purpose prong by
considering how the evolution of the displays may affect an objective
observer.9" Moreover, the instant Court's modified Lemon test fails to
illustrate a constitutional violation in this case because an objective
observer may have only viewed the third displays of the Commandments,
which did not primarily promote religion due to the incorporation of other
legal and historical documents.9 ' The instant Court intends to create an
absolute line between neutral and unconstitutional actions, yet the instant
Court's inconsistencies in deciding previous case law demonstrate the
fallacy of this principle.92
Additionally, the instant Court's focus on the evolution of the displays
suggests that the constitutionality of a legislative action depends solely on
the initial, rather than on the current purpose. 93 Unless the government's
initial action promotes a secular purpose, the instant Court's decision risks
that the final action will always be susceptible to constitutional attack. 94
Although the instant Court explained that the Respondents' original
purpose would not prevent them from creating a suitable display in the

88. See supra text accompanying note 67. See McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2737 n. 14
(noting that "[o]ne consequence of taking account of the purpose underlying past actions is that the
same government action may be constitutional if taken in the first instance and unconstitutional if
it has a sectarian heritage"). For example, on the same day as the instant case, the instant Court
decided Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005). In that case, the Court ruled that a display of
the Commandments on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol did not violate the Establishment
Clause because it was a passive monument with historical meaning and because no one challenged
the display for forty years. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858-59. Unlike in the instant case, in Van
Orden, the Court emphasized that First Amendment analysis should focus more on a "monument's
nature and the Nation's history" rather than the Lemon test when the display in question is only a
passive monument. Id. at 2861.
89. See supra text accompanying note 71.
90. See McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2736-37.
91. See supra text accompanying note 85. "Judicial caveats against entanglement must
recognize that the line of separation ....
is a . . . variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship.... [H]owever, . . . we are [not] to engage in a legalistic
minuet in which precise rules ... must govern." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
92. See supra text accompanying note 14.
93. See McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2763 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. See id.
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future,9 5 the instant Court neglects the Respondents' revised displays by
comparing their initial motivations to their current purpose.9 6 Therefore,
the instant Court's analysis of neutrality under the Lemon test creates a
slippery slope for future Establishment Clause claims.97
Unlike the observers in Stone or SantaFe, the objective observer of the
courthouse displays in the instant case would probably not be an
impressionable student.98 In Stone, every day students were exposed to an
isolated copy of the Commandments posted on their classroom wall.99
However, in the instant case, the observer objecting to the courthouse
displays was the American Civil Liberties Union, an entity which often
fights against government entanglement in religion, but probably not
regularly exposed to the courtroom displays.' 0 In the instant case, a
reasonable observer could read the copy of the posted resolution, which
explicitly stated that the purpose of the display was secular, and not
intended to advance religion."10 Moreover, in the instant case, the objective
observer could reasonably perceive the revised displays as possessing a
secular purpose because nothing in the display explicitly encouraged
religious participation;"0 2 whereas in Santa Fe, the school continually
supported student-led prayers. 0 3
The instant Court's application of the Lemon test also infringes on the
intent of the Framers of the First Amendment to require proof of coercion
in finding a violation of the Establishment Clause.t" The instant Court
noted that it is difficult to interpret Establishment Clause issues due to the
ambiguity in the language of the First Amendment; however, it is more
complicated to rule on alleged violations based on an objective observer's
opinion of purpose rather than returning to the Framers' coercion
standard.0 5 Furthermore, the instant Court's analysis fails to demonstrate
95. Id. at 2741.
96. See id. at 2763-64 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
97. See id.
at 2752 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 32 & 43.
99. See supra text accompanying note 32.
100. See McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2729.
101. See supratext accompanying note 6.
102. See id.at 2763 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that a plaque, accompanying the display,
informed passersby that the documents in the display influenced the law and government).
103. See supra text accompanying note 51.
104. See supra text accompanying note 13.
105. See supra text accompanying note 59. See also Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S.Ct. 2854,
2865, 2867 (2005) (Thomas, J. concurring). Justice Thomas affirmed that it would be easier for the
Court to apply the Framers' definition of "establishment" than for the Court to continue applying
other terminology. Id.at 2865. Previously the Court has stated that "[t]he Framers understood an
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how the display of the Commandments coerced a courtroom observer to
engage in religious worship or to pray any more than the friezes displayed
in the instant Court's own courthouse." °6 If the Supreme Court permits a
frieze that integrates Moses holding a version of the Commandments, but
deems that the instant case integrated displays of the Commandments are
offensive to an objective observer, then the principle of neutrality becomes
subjective, and any religious reference may arbitrarily become
unconstitutional regardless of its current context. 0 7 Instead, by applying
the Framers' test for an Establishment Clause violation, the displays would
be considered passive monuments because they do not lead to
impermissible government coercion.'0 8
Finally, stringent application of the Lemon test may lead to a separation
of powers encroachment if the judiciary fails to give the legislature
deference when enacting statutes or resolutions. 0 9 The majority stated that
the government's asserted reasons for an action will generally receive
deference, yet the instant Court affirmed the injunctive order even after the
Respondents revised the displays twice.10 The instant Court failed to
acknowledge the plain meaning of the resolutions, which asserted the
Respondents' secular purpose of the revised displays."' Therefore, the
instant Court creates ambiguity by favoring a hypothetical objective
observer's interpretation of a display over a statute's plain meaning. Such
an analysis seems especially unnecessary when a notation accompanies the
display." 2 In the interest of public policy, the Lemon test and the principle
of neutrality should not be the default standards used to assess alleged

establishment 'necessarily [to] involve actual legal coercion."' Id.(citing Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004)).
106. See supra text accompanying note 85. Furthermore, the contents of the Ten
Commandments, similar to the constitutionally reimbursed textbooks in Lemon, were
"ascertainable" and did not require ongoing surveillance. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617
(1971).
107. But see supratext accompanying note 78.
108. See Van Orden, 125 S.Ct. at 2865.
109. See supra text accompanying note 41; see infra text accompanying note 112.
110. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2727, 2733 (2005).
111. See supra text accompanying note 6. But see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,594-95
(1987) (noting that determination of purpose looks to the "plain meaning of the statute's words,
enlightened by their context and the contemporaneous legislative history [and] the historical
context of the statute .... and the specific sequence of events leading to [its] passage").
112. See McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2763 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (reasoning that a statute should be given deference when
inquiry into the legislative purpose shows that the statute clearly states that it is intended to enhance
the quality of the secular education).
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constitutional violations of the Establishment Clause, especially when the
legislative body has attempted to comply with the First Amendment." 3
The Lemon test may no longer suffice to prove a First Amendment
violation because application of the Lemon test leads to inconsistent
results." 4 Although evidence of a secular purpose in governmental action
continues to be determinative of constitutionality, the instant Court
continues to struggle with whether the secular purpose has to be the
predominate purpose in the eye of the objective observer." 5 The Court
should shift the focus of its Establishment Clause analysis from an
evaluation of purpose under Lemon to an evaluation of coercion." 6 Due to
the integration of religion with law throughout the Nation's history, the
Court should redefine the Lemon test and the principle of neutrality." 7
Otherwise, the Court will continue to perpetuate the fine line between a
governmental action with a primary religious purpose, which is
unconstitutional, and a secondary religious purpose, such as the
Respondents' third displays, which should be constitutional." 8 Finally, as
long as the Court supports religious references in various fora and relies
on the objective observer's determination of purpose, then the Court must
evaluate a governmental action solely in its current context.19

113. McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2763 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 2750-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also supra text accompanying notes 17 & 19.
115. See McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2757 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 2761-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 2750-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. See id. at 2751 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court has failed to consistently
apply the principle of neutrality).
119. See id. at 2757 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

